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I. INTRODUCTION

How are judicial decisions made? What legal foundations do
judges rely on? What theories or principles should inform their
1
reasoning? Richard Posner addresses these questions in his new
book, Law, Pragmatism and Democracy. In addition to his career as a
judge, Posner is a prolific author and influential theorist. In the
2
recently decided Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas, Posner’s
3
4
work was cited by both the majority opinion and the dissent. In
his most recent work, Posner has compiled and adapted ideas he

† William Mitchell College of Law, J.D. candidate May 2004; Editor, William
Mitchell Law Review, Volume 30.
1. Richard A. Posner is a judge for the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit and Senior Lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School.
Richard A. Posner, Curriculum Vitae, available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/
faculty/posner-r/cv.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2003). His publications include
RICHARD POSNER & TOMAS J. PHILIPSON, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH: THE
AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993); RICHARD POSNER, AGING AND
OLD AGE (1995); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF M ORAL AND LEGAL
THEORY (1999); RICHARD POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION,
IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999). Richard A. Posner,
Biography, available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~rposner/biography. Included
among the topics of his current research are judicial administration, evidence,
intellectual property, health economics and policy, citations analysis, the public
intellectual, antitrust, and jurisprudence and moral theory. Id.
2. 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003).
3. Id. at 2483.
4. Id. at 2489-90.
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has developed in lectures, papers, and law review articles
advocating for a pragmatic approach to law as well as a pragmatic
view of American democracy. As Posner states in the preface, the
book “argues for a theory of pragmatic liberalism the twin halves of
which are a pragmatic theory of democracy and a pragmatic theory
6
of law.”
II. OVERVIEW
Posner builds support for his proposition that pragmatism
should predominate in law and government by reviewing the
background of philosophical pragmatism. From Odysseus,
Socrates, and Plato to Wittgenstein, James, and Dewey, Posner
traces the historical development of pragmatic theory. In Chapters
1 and 2, Posner explains the distinction between what he views as
the two current branches of pragmatism: philosophical, or
academic, pragmatism and what Posner refers to as “everyday
7
pragmatism.” Philosophical pragmatism is “academic, subtle,
complex and carried on in a forbidding technical vocabulary . . . . It
8
also tends to be contemplative rather than action-oriented.” On
the other hand, Posner defines “everyday pragmatism” as “practical
and business-like, ‘no-nonsense,’ disdainful of abstract theory and
intellectual pretension, contemptuous of moralizers and utopian
9
dreamers.” As applied to adjudication, everyday pragmatism is “a
heightened concern with consequences or . . . ‘a disposition to
ground policy judgments on facts and consequences rather than on
10
conceptualisms and generalities.’”
Posner begins to link his analysis of philosophical pragmatism
with democracy in Chapter 3 by discussing the philosophy of John
11
Dewey. Posner labels Dewey’s theory of democracy “deliberative
12
democracy.” Deliberative democracy is “not . . . a clash of wills
5. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY x-xii (2003)
[hereinafter “POSNER”].
6. Id. at ix.
7. Id. at 49.
8. Id. at 52.
9. Id. at 50.
10. Id. at 59.
11. John Dewey, along with William James, were primary proponents of the
school of thought known as “pragmatism.” John Dewey, Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy 1-3, available at http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/dewey.htm (last
visited Aug. 5, 2003).
12. POSNER at 106.
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and interests . . . [but] the pooling of different ideas and
approaches and the selection of the best through debate and
13
discussion.”
Posner moves from this discussion to a contrast between
concepts of democracy in Chapters 4 and 5. In these chapters,
Posner proposes two concepts of democracy—Concept 1 and
14
Concept 2. Concept 1 democracy, similar to Dewey’s deliberative
democracy, “is premised on the idea that every adult . . . has a
moral right to participate on terms of equality in the governance of
15
the society.” Concept 1 is the ideal of democracy, relying on
voters to be “both informed and disinterested and that voting be
based on the ideas and opinions that emerge from deliberation
16
among these informed and disinterested citizens.”
While Concept 1 may be what we should aspire to, Posner
argues that it is not an accurate depiction of current American
17
democracy.
He offers a different conception of democracy
modeled on the philosopher Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of “elite
18
19
democracy,” described as “realistic, cynical and bottom-up.”
Posner’s adaptation of that theory, labeled Concept 2 democracy,
presents democracy as “a competition among self-interested
politicians, constituting a ruling class, for the support of the
people, also assumed to be self-interested, and to be none too
20
interested in or well informed about politics.”
Chapters 6, 8, and 9 are the most accessible and, maybe for
that reason, the most interesting chapters in the book. Posner
applies his pragmatic theories to two of the most publicized United
21
States Supreme Court cases in recent years—Clinton v. Jones and
22
Bush v. Gore. Posner suggests that Jones represents an unpragmatic
decision because it overemphasized doctrine at the expense of
23
consequences and “condemned the nation to a political crisis.”
Conversely, he argues that Bush v. Gore exemplifies everyday
pragmatism. Ideology and precedent were overruled, even by
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 106-07.
Id. at 130.
Id. at 131.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id. at 144.
520 U.S. 681(1997).
531 U.S. 98 (2000).
POSNER at 319.
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usually doctrinaire justices, by the need to prevent a presidential
24
succession crisis.
In Chapter 7, Posner discusses and compares the theories
relating law and economics of two Austrian philosophers—Hans
Kelsen and Friedrich Hayek. This subject is included to encourage
pragmatic jurists to incorporate theories that may be considered
external to law into their decision-making. This chapter augments
material already presented in earlier chapters, but structurally
seems out of place at this point in the book. Posner should have
placed this chapter before or after the chapter on Dewey because
the concepts presented would have flowed more coherently.
The final chapter, Chapter 10, also feels misplaced or tacked
on. Slightly outside the framework of the book, yet related, the
final chapter presents an analysis of First Amendment cases. Here,
Posner argues that First Amendment protections should be relative,
not absolute.25 From the pragmatist viewpoint, especially relevant
after September 11, the purpose of a law and its attendant costs
and benefits should be considered when determining
26
constitutionality, not simply the effect on the right to free speech.
III. REVIEW
Posner presents a compelling case in support of basing
decisions on pragmatic analysis. He effectively argues that opinions
reached through consideration of multiple factors, not just stare
decisis or a moral code, result in better decisions with more
beneficial consequences. He uses several well-known cases—Roe v.
Wade, Clinton v. Jones, and Bush v. Gore—to convincingly illustrate
his theory.
While advocating for pragmatism, Posner also addresses other
issues, including diversity in the judiciary. His support for a diverse
representation of judges is an outgrowth of his pragmatic approach
to adjudication. With society becoming increasingly diverse,
Posner contends that the most pragmatic way to reach decisions
with the best consequences is to have them made by a judiciary that
27
reflects society. “Such a judiciary is more representative, and its
decisions will therefore command greater acceptance in a diverse

24. Id. at 331.
25. Id. at 357.
26. Id. at 362.
27. Id. at 119-21.
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society than would the decisions of a mandarin court.”
Throughout the book, Posner reveals his sarcastic sense of
humor. While criticizing the condescension of some university
faculty, he describes their view of the average American voter as
“ignorant, philistine, provincial, selfish, excessively materialistic,
puritanical . . . superficial, vulgar, insensitive, unimaginative,
complacent, chauvinistic, superstitious, uneducable, benighted
29
politically, prone to hysteria, and overweight.” Politicians are also
subject to Posner’s barbs. He states that “the average quality, both
intellectual and moral, of elected and unelected officials alike has
been unimpressive. On the state and local level it has frequently
30
been appalling.” In a book where the writing is challenging,
Posner frequently emphasizes a point by lowering the level of
discussion. In commenting on a statement that restrictions on civil
liberties due to September 11 would cause the country to “lose its
democratic soul,” Posner responds by stating, “[t]his is rhetoric to
31
make the pragmatist gag.”
Posner is excellent at anticipating the response his arguments
will elicit. Often, as I was reading passages from the book, I would
wonder if he had considered an alternative viewpoint. In almost
every instance, Posner would address that alternative in the next
sentence or paragraph. For example, after reading Posner’s rather
grim definition of Concept 2 democracy and his assertion that it
32
describes American democracy, I felt he was being too cynical.
But Posner counters by explaining the virtues of the current
American democracy, virtues responsible for “reducing the amount
and intensity of citizen involvement in politics, freeing up time for
other, potentially more rewarding and socially beneficial activities
and reducing the temperature of political debate and so the level
33
of social conflict, thus promoting political stability.”
One issue with the book is not a criticism as much as it is a
desire for more. While providing a strong argument in favor of
pragmatism, Posner does not provide a means to determine if a
current decision is pragmatic. As one reviewer wrote, “[i]f
pragmatism is merely the effort to do what makes sense, how can

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 120.
Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 150.
Id. at 312.
Id. at 150-54.
Id. at 175.
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we know what makes sense without some overarching set of values
34
or principles by which to judge the consequences of our actions?”
35
For example, Posner criticizes the Roe v. Wade decision as being a
bad pragmatic decision because of the social turmoil that resulted.
This seems slightly unfair coming thirty years after the decision and
after being able to observe the controversy surrounding the
decision. At the time, perhaps the justices in the majority felt they
were considering all relevant factors. As Posner notes in this book,
36
the trend in several states had been to relax abortion laws. The
Court may have felt that the majority of the country was moving in
the direction of legalizing abortion and may have felt that a
decision guaranteeing access to abortion would lessen the
remaining controversy.
What would Posner think of the current decision in Lawrence v.
Texas? The decision protecting the right of consenting adults to
engage in sodomy in the privacy of their home stirs some of the
same strong emotions, and motivates some of the same opponents,
as did Roe v. Wade. The portion of the opinion that considers the
history of laws against sodomy and reviews the status of current
state statutes seems to be adopting a pragmatic approach to
37
38
reaching a decision. However, if subsequent decisions relying on
Lawrence lead to legalization of same-sex marriage, resulting in
controversy and protest, would Posner judge the decision
unpragmatic? How can we determine at the time a decision is
made if it is unpragmatic?
A case that demonstrates what might be pragmatism in
39
disguise is In re Weber v. Bennett. A textbook description of this
case involving a signature on a will states:
34. Paul Horwitz, Pragmatism and Its Consequences: A Review of Richard A.
Posner’s LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY, available at http://writ.findlaw.com/
books/reviews/20030530_horwitz.html (May 30, 2003) (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
35. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. POSNER at 126.
37. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2478-81 (2003).
38. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court may rule soon in the case of
Goodridge v. Massachusetts Dept. of Public Health, 2002 WL 1299135 (May 7, 2002). A
suit was filed on behalf of seven same-sex couples seeking to invalidate current
Massachusetts law limiting marriage to opposite sex couples. Goodridge v. Dept. of
Public Health, available at http://www.marriagewatch.org/cases/ma/goodridge/
goodridge.htm (last visited Sept. 7, 2003). In addition, two men filed suit in
Phoenix, Arizona on July 7, 2003, demanding a state marriage license. Arizona
Becomes Site of Next Same-Sex “Marriage” Challenge, available at http://www.
marriagewatch.org/news/072503a.htm (July 25, 2003) (last visited Sept. 7, 2003).
39. 387 P.2d 165 (Kan. 1963).
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The president [of the bank] signs as a witness in [the
testator’s] car, then takes the will inside the teller’s office
where the teller, sitting in the [drive-up]
window, signs as
40
a witness and waves to the depositor.
The court held that the will could not be probated because the
41
teller had not signed as a witness in the presence of the testator.
Is this an everyday pragmatic decision, or a dogmatically
doctrinaire decision? Initially it seems to be strictly a rule-driven
decision. However, the will prepared by the president did not
reflect the testamentary intentions of the testator because it
42
omitted a bequest to the testator’s wife. So by invalidating the will
based on the technicality, the court was able to approximate the
wishes of the testator by having the wife inherit through the laws of
intestacy. But was it for pragmatic reasons that the court came to
its decision? Or was the narrow explanation given earlier the real
reason? Posner’s theories do not help us make a determination.
Posner’s book serves best as a general prescriptive theory or
approach to law rather than a guide to help judges come to a
decision or to assess the pragmatism of decisions. With all the types
of factors that Posner would encourage courts to consider—
economic, social, legal, long-term, short-term—a judge could feel
intimidated. And while Posner’s approach would be ideal if all
judges were of high caliber, the proficiency and skill of judges
range as widely as in any profession. Employing legal pragmatism,
as defined by Posner, may be the preferred adjudication method if
judges had the time to weigh the varied factors he enumerates.
However, given the constrictions of time and the variance in ability,
relying on stare decisis and adhering to statutory language may
provide a modicum of stability and predictability.
Another reason judges may choose not to rely on legal
pragmatism is self-interest, or self-protection. Having almost
unlimited sources influencing and informing a judge may lead to
decisions being viewed as products of an individual judge’s
predilections, rather than the results of impersonal, objective
applications of the law. Posner admits that this might be the case
when he states that “[p]ragmatic decisionmaking will inevitably be
based to a disquieting extent on hunches and subjective
40. JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS,
234 (6th ed. 2000).
41. Id.
42. In re Weber, 387 P.2d at 167.
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preferences rather than on hard evidence.” Perhaps judges do
not want that level of discretion, with the accompanying
responsibility.
For those interested in theories of the law or in reading a book
by Posner, but without a familiarity with philosophy, the first few
chapters are intimidating, seemingly written for the cognoscenti.
Posner refers to many “-isms” and many philosophers, but only
briefly and tangentially explaining their theories in understandable
terms. For example, when presenting the two concepts of
democracy, Posner discusses “abstractness,” or “how closely a
theorist models political deliberation on his own academic mode of
44
discussion.” The next sentence states, “Cohen and Richardson,
45
for example, are more abstract than Gutmann and Thompson.”
But Posner does not explain who these people are, or why we
should care.
This leads to another issue with the book: the structural
organization. Posner explains in the preface that the chapters
46
originated as lecture material, law review articles, or papers. This
is evident in several passages, such as the one quoted above, where
Posner omits contextual information that would make the material
meaningful. Also, the inclusion and placement of the chapters on
Kelsen and Haydek, and on the First Amendment purposive
argument, seem awkward, not fitting in with the other material.
IV. CONCLUSION
With this book, Posner is promoting a pragmatic approach to
arriving at decisions, especially, as he writes in the conclusion, for
“cases that arise out of national emergencies—cases involving war,
terrorism, economic depression, a botched national election, a
Presidential scandal. Such cases are not infrequent in our
dynamic, even turbulent, society, and they are among the most
47
important cases that judges decide.”
According to Posner,
pragmatism in law depends to a large degree on the pragmatism in
society. In his conclusion, Posner presents his vision of the
connection between Concept 2 democracy—pragmatic or
American democracy—and pragmatic adjudication. He states that
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

POSNER at 126.
Id. at 133.
Id.
Id. at x-xii.
Id. at 386.
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“[o]ne’s conception of the optimal scope and freedom of judges
depends, to a degree largely unrecognized by the legal profession,
including its academic and judicial branches, on one’s conception
48
of American democracy.”
As a prescription for adjudication, the book makes a persuasive
argument for adopting Posner’s pragmatic approach. But how
does one evaluate whether a pragmatic approach has been taken?
With the breadth of doctrines and theories that can and should be
considered by an everyday pragmatic jurist, how can we determine
if the pragmatic approach has been used? Posner acknowledges
the limitations in being able to assess decisions, because “[t]here
49
are bad pragmatic decisions as well as good ones.” What would
help in identifying pragmatic decisions is to adopt another of
Posner’s recommendations: writing opinions with a “certain
50
transparency” in vocabulary. Posner states, “in order to make it
easier for people to conform to the rules expressed or implied [in
opinions] . . . judicial opinions should be more candid than they
typically are about the pragmatic factors that determine the
outcome of the most difficult and the most important judicial
51
decisions.”
Perhaps the book is not intended to provide a formal structure
to guide decisions or an analytical framework by which to
determine if decisions are pragmatic. That may be too ambitious
or even unobtainable. Perhaps it is intended as a paean to
pragmatic adjudication and American democracy. At that, it
succeeds.

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 125.
Id. at 55.
Id.
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